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Abstract
The emission targets adopted in the Kyoto Protocol1 far exceed the likely level of
emissions from Russia and Ukraine.2,3   These countries could sell their “bubbles” if the
Protocol enters into force and industrialized countries establish an international
emission trading system.  Using the most recent, comprehensive scenarios2 for
emissions of carbon dioxide from the energy system we estimate that during the
Protocol’s 2008-2012 “budget period” the bubble will range from 9 MtC (million tons
of carbon) to 900 MtC for Russia and 3 MtC to 200 MtC for Ukraine.  Even scenarios
with high economic growth and carbon-intensive technologies do not burst the bubble
before the budget period.  In the central (“middle course”) scenario the total carbon
bubble exceeds 1000 MtC, is worth 22 to 170 billion US Dollars (4 to 34 billion US
Dollars per year), and does not burst until 2040.  This flow of assets, which could
exceed Russian earnings from natural gas exports ($10 billion in 19974), is comparable
with projected total investments in the Russian energy system for 2008-2012.  If
directed towards low-carbon infrastructure investments (e.g., gas pipelines, safe nuclear
power), bubble transfers could reinforce and partially lock-in decarbonization of the
world energy system.
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The Kyoto Protocol Carbon Bubble:
Implications for Russia, Ukraine and
Emission Trading
David G. Victor,∗ Nebojsa Nakicenovic,† Nadejda Victor∗∗
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)
requires that industrialized countries, listed in Annex I, cut their annual emissions of
greenhouse gases an average of about 5% below 1990 levels during 2008-2012.  Annex
B of the Protocol allocates that collective target among 38 countries and the European
Community.  Those targets apply to sources and sinks of six greenhouse gases; for
simplicity, in this analysis we consider only the most important human cause of global
warming: CO2 released during combustion of fossil fuels.
The Protocol allows creation of various systems for emissions trading system in
which countries that exceed their Annex B target can remain in compliance by
purchasing surplus permits from other Annex B countries (Articles 4, 6 & 17 of Ref. 1).
As with any trading system, the flow and value of emission permits will depend upon
their initial distribution, supply and demand.  Here we focus on the aspect of that
potential trading system that has been the most politically sensitive:  the number and
value of permits that were granted to Russia and Ukraine, which we term the “carbon
bubble.”  (Observers politically hostile to this allocation of assets have dubbed it “hot
air.”)
The Kyoto commitments require that both Russia and Ukraine freeze emissions
at 1990 levels.  Because of economic disarray with the collapse of the Soviet empire and
central planning, CO2 emissions peaked in the late 1980s, declined sharply in the early
1990s, and are likely to remain below 1990 levels in the near future.
The size and value of the bubble will depend on the level and timing of recovery
relative to the 2008-2012 “budget period” as well as technological choices.  Because
these factors are especially difficult to predict, we employ six scenarios developed at the
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2International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and World Energy
Council (WEC) that are especially suited to long-term global-scale analysis of the
energy system.  They encompass three cases of future developments (A, B, and C)
subdivided into six alternative scenarios (A1, A2, A3, B, C1 and C2).  Case A envisions
a future of impressive technological improvements and consequent high economic
growth.  It has three variants, which reflect alternative futures for fossil fuel resources
that can be tapped and non-fossil technologies.  In scenario A1, oil and gas are abundant
and remain the dominant fuel sources.  In scenario A2, oil and gas are scarce and thus
coal becomes the dominant source.  In scenario A3, improvements in non-fossil
technologies (renewables and nuclear) lead to the long-term elimination of fossil fuels
for reasons of economy rather than scarcity.  Case B is a central “middle course”
scenario.  Case C envisions a “green” future with substantial technological progress,
unprecedented international cooperation to protect the environment, and measures to
attain international equity.  In Scenario C1 nuclear power is a transient technology that
is replaced by non-nuclear low-carbon technologies such as solar hydrogen, while in
scenario C2 new reactor technologies lead to renewed growth in nuclear over the same
period.  For the near-term Kyoto period, the most important differences between the
scenarios are the level of economic growth (high in A, moderate in B and C) and the
technologies employed (high carbon in A2; medium carbon in A1 and B; low carbon in
A3, C1 and C2).
The IIASA-WEC scenarios are especially useful for analyzing the demand for
and supply of carbon bubble permits because they provide both global coverage and
harmonized regional detail.  For each scenario the Study Team quantified basic
assumptions (e.g., population and GDP) and calculated outputs (e.g., CO2 emissions)
through iterative use2,5,6 of two models: (a) an 11 region version of the macroeconomic
model “Global 2100,”7 and (b) IIASA’s linear programming energy system model
“MESSAGE III.”8  The scenarios were reviewed extensively by over 100 regional
experts through two rounds of publications in 19959 and 1998.2
Figure 1 shows estimated carbon emissions for Annex I countries for these six
scenarios and, for comparison, all other published scenarios.  Table 2 reports the
difference between those estimated emissions levels and the targets adopted in the
Kyoto Protocol.  In all scenarios the “reforming” industrial economies of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union are in surplus.  In nearly every scenario, the largest
surplus is from the former Soviet Union.
In principle, carbon bubbles could exist in many of the 8 East European and 5
former Soviet countries listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.  However, in practice,
only Russia and Ukraine are likely to sell substantial quantities of bubble permits.  The
surplus in the East European region (table 2) is largely the consequence of four nations
(Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) adjusting their base years to dates prior to
1990 when emissions were higher, which has given these countries targets that are less
stringent than suggested by Annex B (see caption to table 2).  Those base year
adjustments also account for why the collective CO2 cut for all Annex I nations is only
4.7%, rather than the 5% goal set for all greenhouse gases in the Kyoto Protocol.
However, the two largest of these countries (Hungary and Poland) are developing close
economic ties with the European Union; it may be politically difficult for these
countries to sell their bubbles since the EU has steadfastly opposed emission trading.
Three of the former Soviet republics—the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania—listed on Annex B have stringent (-8%) targets and are unlikely to have
much surplus available for sale.
3Figure 1: Annex I emissions of CO2 due to combustion of fossil fuels for the six
IIASA/WEC scenarios2 (heavy colored lines and inset), all other published
scenarios for Annex I (light lines), and actual emissions (black line).  In the early
1990s, Annex I as a whole tracks the case C scenarios most closely because of deep
reductions in CO2 from the reforming countries.  Other scenarios are drawn from
the Morita and Lee3 comprehensive database of 416 scenarios from 171 literature
sources (including scenario evaluation activities such as the Energy Modeling
Forum and the International Energy Workshop) compiled by for the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on Emissions
Scenarios (SRES).  Historical data are from Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(through 1990, excluding cement manufacture)10 and updated with adjusted data
from the International Energy Agency.11  1991 data are interpolated because
adequate data for the former Soviet region are unavailable.
In 1990 Russia and Ukraine accounted for 650 MtC (63%) and 180 MtC (17%)
of emissions from the former Soviet Union, respectively.  For comparison, official data
reported by Russia to the FCCC indicates 1990 emission levels of 648 MtC.20  Ukraine
has not reported official emission estimates. Table 3 compares projected emissions
under the six scenarios for these two countries with the Kyoto targets for 2008-2012.
The range of numbers is indicative of a plausible range in the possible magnitude of the
bubble.
Figure 2 shows the scenarios for the former Soviet Union.  The IIASA-WEC
scenarios (especially B) track historical emissions closely.  They are also systematically
lower than most other scenarios, which reflects that other studies probably over-estimate
emissions from this region for at least one of three reasons.  (1) Some scenarios employ
base years prior to 1990 when emissions were higher.  (2) Most scenarios are long-term
with the first reporting year of 2010 and thus do not provide the resolution needed to
determine compliance with short-term targets such as in the Kyoto Protocol.  (3) Even
the few available shorter-term scenarios have systematically underestimated the depth
of economic recession (e.g., refs 12 and 13) or have not employed transparent data and
methods to allow reproduction of the numbers (ref. 14).
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4Table 1: IIASA/WEC Scenarios, summary of main indicators for 2020 and 2050.
The A and B series are “non-intervention” (i.e. they do not include policies to limit
carbon dioxide beyond what nations have already implemented today).  Series C
include a tax that rises steadily, beginning after 2000, to $200 per ton of carbon by
2100.  Some proceeds from the tax are distributed to developing countries to
compensate them for the costs of slowing global warming.
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5Table 2: Emissions of carbon dioxide due to combustion of fossil fuels in the five
regions that constitute Annex I (“Industrialized”) countries.  The table shows
emissions in 1990, the target adopted in Kyoto, and the level of emissions that are
in excess (or below) the five-year Kyoto target.  Targets are expressed as the
percentage change from 1990 levels and are weighted to account for two factors.
(1) Within each region, national targets vary; in the absence of robust predictions
for future emissions of every country, we weighted the national targets according
to 1990 emissions.  (For illustrative purposes, when weighting targets we ignore the
small fraction of emissions from the East European and former Soviet nations that
are not subjected to Annex B targets.)  (2) As permitted by Decision of the
Conference of the Parties to the FCCC,15 four countries in Eastern Europe
(Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania) have selected non-standard base years.
Emissions in those base years are higher (15% to 17%) than in 1990, which makes
the Kyoto target for those countries, in effect, less stringent.  If base year
adjustment were not allowed and all other factors had remained constant, the
weighted Kyoto target for Eastern Europe would have been –7%.  CO2 emissions
are net values, which exclude feedstocks, gas used for enhanced oil recovery, and
non-energy emissions.
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For Annex I as a whole only the “green” scenarios (C1 and C2) lead to
emissions below the Kyoto targets, which suggests that in the absence of emission
trading compliance with the Kyoto Protocol can be attained only with radical shifts in
technology.  In other scenarios, some advanced industrialized nations (Australia, Japan,
New Zealand, North America, and Western Europe) can attain compliance by
purchasing permits from regions in surplus.  However, in none of those scenarios are the
Russian and Ukrainian bubbles sufficiently large that all of the advanced industrialized
nations can comply with the Protocol merely through acquisition of bubble permits.
To estimate the resources that might flow as the carbon bubbles are traded, we
consider several prices for permits.  For a low price we use $20 per ton, which is within
the range ($14 to $23) quoted in the much-cited study by the US Council of Economic
Advisers on the cost of implementing the Kyoto Protocol.16  Many other analysts (e.g.,
ref. 17) have criticized that study’s assumptions, such as the widespread availability of
low-cost carbon abatement options and extensive markets in emissions permits.  Thus
we consider two other permit prices that are characteristic of results using
6macroeconomic models for Kyoto-like runs with realistic assumptions: $50 per ton
(optimistic assumptions) and $150 (pessimistic assumptions, such as inefficient
markets).  Other studies of Annex I trading cite similar prices,17,18 but the range of
plausible permit prices remains wide because there is no agreement among experts on
the cost of carbon abatement nor the near-term feasibility of establishing various forms
of emission trading, including trading with developing countries.   It is possible that
during transient periods (including the 5-year Kyoto “budget period”) that permit prices
could be much higher, especially if intertemporal permit borrowing is restricted.  Table
4 shows the estimated values of the carbon bubbles with these assumptions.
Table 3:  Russia and Ukraine emissions of carbon dioxide from combustion of
fossil fuels.   Values (MtC) are the surplus relative to the Kyoto target for the six
IIASA/WEC scenarios.  National figures are weighted from the total for the FSU
region (63% and 17% for Russia and Ukraine, respectively).  The Kyoto target
(0%) is slightly different from the value in table 1 because the latter includes the –
8% targets for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  We assume that Russia and
Ukraine account for 63% and 17% of the Former Soviet Union on the basis of
adjusted 1990 data from the International Energy Agency (ref. 19, p.31).  These
data are probably uncertain by as much as 10% but are consistent with other
sources.  Using these fractions, we calculate that 1990 fossil fuel CO2 emission
levels were 650 MtC (Russia) and 178 MtC (Ukraine).  These fractions and
numbers are also consistent with historical data for the former Soviet Union
compiled by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (see figure 2 and ref. 10).  The
IIASA/WEC emissions are reported only on a decadal basis, which we have
interpolated to allow estimates for the five-year period 2008-2012.
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Each scenario yields a significant carbon bubble.  The smallest bubble (12 MtC,
$1.8 billion) occurs in scenario A2 (high economic growth and carbon-intensive
technologies).
The largest bubble is in the “middle course” (B) scenario, which IIASA-WEC
reviews2 suggest is the most likely outcome.  In this scenario, continued weakness in the
former Soviet economies dampens growth in emissions.  Stronger economies and
continued use of carbon-intensive fuels (e.g., coal) in the West raises demand for
permits (if Western regions intend to comply with the Kyoto Protocol), which suggests
that permit prices will equal or exceed our middle estimate.
7Figure 2: Emissions of CO2 from the former Soviet Union due to combustion of
fossil fuels under the six IIASA/WEC scenarios2 (heavy colored lines and inset),
other scenarios3 (light lines), and actual emissions (black line).  We show the whole
former Soviet region because Russia and Ukraine constitute the largest portion
(80%), historical data for the separate republics are unavailable prior to 1992, and
most models and scenario exercises (including IIASA-WEC) aggregate the region
as one.  (Data sources same as in figure 1.)
Although we have excluded the non-CO2 greenhouse gases, if data and models
were available to include them in the analysis the results would be similar.  Russia’s
official “communication” to the FCCC indicates that fossil fuel CO2 accounted for 79%
of greenhouse gas emissions in 1990, with the balance due to CH4 (18%) and N2O
(3%).20  (To allow comparison with official reports, emissions of different greenhouse
gases are converted into common units using the standard 100-year “global warming
potentials” adopted by IPCC in 1995.21,22)  Other recent (1997) Russian studies confirm
these proportions.23,24  Russia has not submitted emission estimates for the other three
greenhouse gases included in the Kyoto Protocol (hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons
or sulfur hexafluoride); however, in other industrial countries emissions of these gases
constitute only a small fraction (<3%) of total emissions.20,25  When the Kyoto Protocol
was adopted Ukraine had not submitted any official emissions inventory, but the
proportion of fossil fuel CO2 and other greenhouse gases are likely to be similar to the
Russian situation.
We also exclude from our analysis CO2 due to land use change and forestry.
Proper management of Russian forests could potentially yield a large carbon sink and an
even larger carbon bubble.  However, accounting rules for sinks in the Kyoto Protocol
are still hotly contested, and the net carbon content of Russian lands (especially forests)
is highly uncertain and variable with time.  Some studies suggest that Russian forests
were a large net carbon sink (184 MtC yr-1) in the early 1990s.26  A recent survey by the
government of Russia concluded that the net sink was 110 MtC sink in 1990 and rose
50% in the early 1990s due to decreased logging of Russian forests.24  Russia’s official
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8FCCC communication reports a net sink of 107 MtC in 1990.20  However, the only
comprehensive independent analysis concludes that Russian forests were a net source of
69 MtC per year for 1988 to 1993 (see methodology in ref. 27, updated with a critical
review of other studies in ref. 28.)  The range of these numbers (approximately 200 MtC
per year, 1000 MtC over five years) suggests that uncertainty in the forest carbon flux is
comparable with the largest estimate for the Russian and Ukrainian carbon bubble for
the five year Kyoto budget period∗.  Since the Kyoto Protocol explicitly includes
forestry (ref. 1, Articles 3.3, 3.4, and 3.7), it may be wiser to delay creation of a legally
binding emission trading system, with substantial resource flows, until there is some
certainty that the resource flows can be estimated and monitored.
Table 4: Estimated value of the Russian and Ukrainian carbon bubbles.  We use
three plausible permit prices, but some combinations of permit prices and
scenarios are not realistic (“nr”).  In the A2 scenario, low permit prices are
implausible because high emissions would raise demand and permit prices,
perhaps above $150 per ton.  In the C scenarios the bubble is not needed for
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol and thus permit prices are likely to be low or
zero.
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Other studies have shown that the Kyoto Protocol’s targets will have little
impact on the long-term concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.29   However,
if the large bubble transfers were tied to low-carbon infrastructure investments (e.g., gas
                                                
∗
 This paper is about the carbon bubble due to the fossil energy system.  The purpose of this calculation
on the forest carbon flux is merely to illustrate the range of uncertainty, importance, and relative
magnitude of terrestrial carbon in the region of the former Soviet Union.  Intense political negotiations are
under way on how to account for carbon fluxes as part of an emission trading system under the Kyoto
Protocol.  Large carbon fluxes, and the attendant implications for an emission trading system, probably
also exist in other regions.  For a recent paper in the huge literature on this topic see, for example, Fan, S.
Gloor, M., Mahlman, J., Pacala, S., Sarmiento, J., Takahashi, T., and Tans, P., “A Large Terrestrial
Carbon Sink in North America Implied by Atmospheric and Oceanic Carbon Dioxide Data and Models,”
Science, 282, 442-446 (1998), which argues the current carbon sink in North America is approximately
1700 MMtC.
9pipelines, safe nuclear power) the resulting pattern of energy development could
reinforce decarbonization of the world energy system.  Indeed, the bubble revenues are
comparable in magnitude with the entire investment being made in the energy system of
the former Soviet Union.  For the 6 IIASA-WEC scenarios, the MESSAGE model
computes that investments in the energy system of the entire former Soviet Union
during 2008-2012 range from $117 billion (scenario B) to $206 billion (scenario A3).
Investments in zero-carbon and low-carbon natural gas range from $80 billion (scenario
B) to $120 billion (scenario A3).  Earmarking could yield additional pipelines to ship
vas Russian resources of low-carbon natural gas Asia—which cost approximately $10
billion per 1000km—and thus offset the growth in carbon-intensive coal, which would
slow global warming and also combat Asian acid rain.  The main proponents of
emissions trading, including Russia and the United States, have indicated opposition to
earmarking of carbon trading revenues.30  However, so far there has been no discussion
of whether and how to link such investments at a high political level (e.g., see ref. 31).
By reinforcing the long-term objective of the FCCC and avoiding a simple transfer of
billions of dollars, such earmarking could also raise the political feasibility of emissions
trading of the bubbles under the Kyoto Protocol.
This analysis also provides an estimate of the date when Russia and Ukraine will
be unable to comply with the Kyoto Protocol without actions to regulate their carbon
dioxide emissions.  Absent external pressure (e.g., trade sanctions), Russia and Ukraine
will exit when the bubble bursts and revenues stop flowing.  Studies on Soviet
participation in international environmental agreements demonstrate that the country
complied with international agreements when it was strictly in its interest to do so,
which is a pattern that continues with Russia.32  That line of argument suggests that
Russia and Ukraine would exit the Kyoto Protocol as early as 2011 (A2 scenario), or
never (C scenarios).  If a 1990 ceiling on emissions continues beyond the Kyoto budget
period, in the most likely scenario (B) the bubble would burst only in 2040.  Exit might
be averted by internal pressure to comply with environmental agreements that is evident
in advanced democracies where public interest environmental groups are politically
strong, but such groups are generally weak and inactive on the global warming issue in
the former Soviet Union.
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